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Article 8

RECENT CASE NOTES
CRIMINAL LAW-SEARCHES AND SEIZURES--INTOXICATING LIQUORs.-Ap-

pellant was convicted and sentenced for possessing and using a still for the
manufacture of intoxicating liquor in violation of Sec. 6, c. 48, Acts 1925.
(Sec. 2719, Burns 1926.) A still, whiskey, mash, and other equipment of
an illicit whiskey manufacturing plant was found in a house raided by officers under authority of a search warrant, and one Byron Smith, also found
in the house, was taken into custody. Appellant objected to the introduction by the state of testimony of Smith, who was convicted prior to appellant's trial, to the effect that appellant was owner of the still and liquor,
and owner and in possession and control of the place searched. This
testimony was in direct conflict with that given by appellant, who objects on
the theory that the authorities had no knowledge of this witness (Smith)
being in or about the prenises except such as they procured while there
executing a warrant which appellant alleges was illegal. No attack was
made upon the search warrant by motion to quash, or other pleading, but
appellant, to sustain his objection to the admission, as evidence, of testimony as to what was seized by the officers and what was disclosed to them
at that time, introduced evidence which proved there was not such a showing of probable cause for the issuance of the warrant as was held to be
necessary in Wallace v. State, 199 Ind. 317, 157 N. E. 657. Appellant
moved for a new trial, alleging that the above mentioned evidence was
incompetent and that the finding of the court was contrary to law and not
sustained by sufficient evidence. The overruling of this motion is assigned
as error. Held: Affirmed. Walker v. State, Supreme Court of Ind., 163
N. E. 229.
It is unnecessary to consider here the question of whether, without a
formal attack upon the search warrant, its validity may be determined upon
objection to testimony obtained by aid thereof, because appellant disclaimed
ownership or control of the premises or the still in question; and illegality
of a search warrant is not available to one not interested in the property
searched or found; nor can objection be made by such stranger to the introduction of the evidence obtained by the search. Piercefield v. State of
Indiana, 198 Ind. 440, 154 N. E. 4; Walker v. State, 194 Ind. 402, 142 N. E.
16; Snedegar v. State, 196 Ind. 254, 146 N. E. 849; Speybroeck v. State,
200 Ind. -,
155 N. E. 817; Earle v. State, 194 Ind. 165, 142 N. E. 405;
Hines v. State, 197 Ind. 575, 150 N. E. 371. The consideration of the above
question is unnecessary for the further reason that the testimony of Byron
Smith was sufficient in itself to support the finding that appellant had possession of a still as charged. Admission of incompetent evidence is not
ground for reversal where there is conclusive, competent evidence of the
defendant's guilt. Sanderson v. State, 82 N. E. 525, 169 Ind. 301; Robinson v. State, 110 N. E. 980, 184 Ind. 208. And the admission of evidence
secured by an alleged unlawful search is held to be not prejudicial to a
defendant in a liquor prosecution, when other evidence sustains the conviction. Van Tarnw-ut et al. v. State, 199 Ind. 481, 157 N. E. 100. The
testimony of Smith, though in direct conflict with appellant's testimony,
must be considered as conclusive and competent evidence since the credi-
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bility of witnesses is for the trier of facts, whose finding, supported by
160
evidence, is conclusive on appeal. Winters v. State, 200 Ind. -,
N. E. 294; Piercefield v. State, supra; Lowery v. State, 196 Ind. 316, 147
N. E. 151, 148 N. E. 197; Hinkle v. State, 91 N. E. 1090, 174 Ind. 276;
Malone v. State, 96 N. E. 1, 176 Ind. 338. The appellant's objection to
Smith's testimony on the theory that the authorities had no knowledge of
Smith's being in or about the premises except that procured while executing an illegal warrant, would avail him nothing, even had the search been
illegal, since appellant could not by such an objection close the mouths of
K. J. M.
witnesses against him as to facts existing prior to the search.
LICENSES-RECEIVERSHIPS-PRIORITY.-One Schindler was appointed re-

ceiver of the Consumers' Service Company Jan. 27, 1925. The order appointing him authorized him to conduct and manage the business of the
company until further order of the court. In November, 1927, the receiver
purchased of the Chemical Sales Corporation, alcohol, to be resold in the
filling stations of the company of which he was receiver, to the amount of
$2,866.00, and accepted a draft drawn on him in that amount, payable December 19, 1927. In March, 1928, $1,000.00 was paid by the receiver to
apply on account of said draft, leaving $1,886.00 still due. The Petitioner,
Chemical Sales Corporation, asks that the claim in above amount be preferred over a claim of the State of Indiana. The state claims that it is
entitled to preference, for the reason that the receiver collected $103,356.00
license fees that have not been turned over to the state, although the state
made frequent demands on the receiver for this money. The funds and
assets are not sufficient to pay the state's claim. These collections were
made by the receiver under Burns' Ann. St. 1926, Sees. 10178, 10179 and
10181, which provide for the imposition of a license fee of 3%c per gallon
on the use of all gasoline used in the state, and provide that the dealer
in gasoline shall collect such license fees from the purchaser, and pay the
same to the auditor of the state. The Act further provides that, if any
dealer fail or refuse to make prompt payment of said fees, he shall be 1ubject to punishment by fine or imprisonment. Held: State entitled to priority. Shipe v. Consumers' Service Co. et al. Dist. Court, N. D. Ind.;
South Bend Division, Aug. 29, 1928, 28 Fed. (2d) 53.
Under the order of the court the receiver became a dealer in gasoline.
Therefore by virtue of the statute which requires a dealer to collect a tax
from the buyer and pay it to the state, the receiver became a trustee of
all license fees collected and held same in trust for the state. Burns' Ann.
St. 1926, Sec. 10178. Where a transaction creates a fiduciary relation, the
trustee or receiver should not and cannot profit thereby, and the cestui que
trust is entitled to prior payment out of the funds in the hands of the
receiver. Carley v. Graves, 48 N. W. 710; Michigan Steamship Co. v.
Thornton, 136 Fed. 134; Massey et al. v. Fisher, 62 Fed. 958. A claim of
a state for a license tax is a prior lien over claims of general creditors.
Marshall v. People of State of New York, 41 Sp. Ct. Rp. 143; Sweet v.
All Package Grocery Stores Co., 262 Fed. 727; Waite v. Worcester Brewing Co., 57 N. E. 176. When a court of chancery takes possession of property and operates the same through a receiver, expenses for the operation
if same, after the appointment of the receiver may be made a preferred
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claim. Kneeland v. American Loan and Trust Co., 136 U. S. 80; Barton V.
Barbour, 104 U. S. 126. Yet this should be done with extreme caution and
if possible, with the consent or acquiescence of the parties interested in the
fund. Wallace v. Loomis, 97 U. S. 146; Mackeel v. Hotchkiss, 60 N. E.
524; Freer v. Davis, 43 S. E. 172. The fact that the supplies are purchased by a receiver is of itself notice that the estate is insolvent and persons selling supplies to a receiver, if expecting to be preferred over other
creditors, must see to it that the court is advised thereof and a preference
given; they cannot deal with the receiver under the presumption that the
court will later give them a preference. Even though the tax money collected and held in trust is mingled with the receivership assets, so that the
identical money cannot be traced, this does not prevent the claim being a
preferred one. First National Bank v. Hummel, 23 Pac. 986.
R. H. L.
MASTER AND SERVANT-WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT-STATUTORY IN-

TERPRETATIN.-Appellee was employed by appellant as a general helper in
the latter's business as dealer in fruits and vegetables. Appellant's son
frequently drove the truck in transporting fruits and vegetables while appellee went along to assist in loading and unloading. On one of such trips
the son of the appellant in negligently starting the truck caused severe
injury to appellee. The appellee averred that appellant had not complied
with Workmen's Compensation Act requiring employer to insure workmen,
and had not given any notice of not operating under the act. Appellant
claims the court has no jurisdiction, that appellee could only apply to the
Industrial Board for adjustment of compensation, and since negligence was
alleged against him personally he is not liable. Held: Damages under common law liability may be recovered for the injury caused by another employee of appellant. Diamond v. Cleary, Appellate Court of Indiana, June
19, 1928, 162 N. E. 372.
The Indiana Workmen's Compensation Act applies to all employers and
employees except those made specifically exempt by the statute as provided
in Burns' Ann. St., Secs. 9447, 9448. Also, an employer may elect not to
operate under the act by giving certain notices as specified in the statute.
All employers, in absence of proof to the contrary, are conclusively presumed to have accepted to operate under the act. Hagenback, etc. Shows
Co. v. Teppert, 66 Ind. App. 261. Where such presumption is not rebutted
the parties are bound by the provisions of the act. American Coal Mining
Co. v. Lewis, 77 Ind. App. 374. However, under the provisions of Burns'
Sec. 9519, any employer who neglects to comply with the provisions of the
act, not having exempted himself as provided, is liable to an injured employee either for compensation under the act or damages at common law.
In the present case the employer did not comply with the provisions of the
act in properly insuring his employee, nor did he give notice of election
not to operate under the act. The appellee can treat his employer as not
having elected not to operate under the act and so may bring action at law
for damages. Talge Mahogany Co. v. Burrows, 191 Ind. 167.
The appellant contends the injury was here caused by a fellow servant
and so a defense for him at law. But by Sec. 10 of the Compensation Act,
Burns', Sec. 9455, an employer "who elects not to operate under this act"
is deprived of the common law fellow servant defense. Appellant did not
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so elect; he is conclusively presumed to be operating under the act. It
seems therefore that the act was meant to supplant entirely all the common law in reference to master and servant liability relations. The act is
considered contractual and its provisions enter into all employment contracts. Rogers v. Rogers, 70 Ind. App. 659; McDowell v. Duer, 18 Ind.
App. 440. Although the appellant did not elect not to operate under the
act, he is bound to comply with the insurance provisions of the act or be
liable to an action at law without the common law defenses of which the
act itself deprives him. Terre Haute I. & E. Traction Co. v. Hayes, 195
Ind. 638; Chesapeake & 0. Ry. Co. v. Hull, 78 Ind. App. 341. The courts
have come to construe the act liberally as in United Paperboard Co. v.
Lewis, 65 Ind. App. 356, and Standard Cabinet Co. v. Landgrove, 65 Ind.
App. 356. Yet, while that part of the act in Burns' Sec. 9455 deprives
of common law defenses those "who elect not to operate under the act,"
this election does not allow one to disclaim operation under the act as a
whole (and so claim common law privileges and defenses) but only to disclaim need for compliance with provisions in reference to insurance and
compensation. In fact because of the contractual nature of the act, it follows that all employers (except agricultural, etc.) are bound by the positive provisions of the act although they should "elect not to operate under
the act," such election going only to determine the basis on which employer's liability should rest.
C. W. D.
NEGLIGENCE-CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE--BURDEN OF PROOF-INSTRUC-

TION.-Appellee was operating an automobile north on Broadway and appellant was operating an automobile east on 25th Street; both streets being
public streets and intersecting at right angles. Appellant was driving
thirty-five miles per hour and failed to yield the right of way to the appellee, who was driver from right, and who entered into the intersection
before the appellant. The cars collided. Appellee brings this action to
recover for damage to his car. Among other instructions given by the
lower court were the following: No. 5. Unless the freedom of such contributory negligence is established by a preponderance of the evidence in the
cause, it is your duty to return a verdict for the defendant. No. 6. The
burden on the question of contributory negligence in actions for damage to
property, under the law in this state, is upon the plaintiff. No. 11. If the
automobile which injured the plaintiff was being operated at a speed in
excess of the speed authorized by the statute, this would justify an inference that the operator was driving at a negligent rate of speed, unless the
jury should believe from other evidence that under the circumstances such
rate was not unlawful and unreasonable. Appellant assigns instructions
No. 5 and No. 11 as error and insists that the court should have instructed
that a driver coming from the right must approach an intersection with the
same degree of care as a driver coming on his left. Appellant did not tender such an instruction. Held: Judgment affirmed. Bodner v. LaFleur,
March 30, 1928. Appellate Court of Indiana, 161 N. E. 696.
Instructions No. 5 and No. 6 taken together seem to fairly represent
the law of this state. The negligence charged was not to be presumed
from the mere happening of the accident, but in order to recover, it must
appear from a preponderance of the evidence that the accident was one
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which in the exercise of reasonable care and foresight the appellant ought
to have anticipated and prevented. Lathrop v. Frank Bird Transfer Company, 81 Ind. App. 549. The Appellate court in that part of their decision
dealing with instruction No. 5, say: "It was not necessary that this instruction should state that the burden of proving that the appellee was
guilty of contributory negligence rested upon the appellant." To avoid
ambiguity the court should have gone farther than "it was not necessary."
It was not only not necessary but, in fact, it would have been error to so
place the burden. This the court admits by saying that instruction No. 6
is a correct statement of the law, which it is. The Pennsylvania Company
v. Gallentine, 77 Ind. 322; Ingle v. Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago and St.
Louis R. Co., 197 Ind. 263; Koplovitz v. Jensen, 197 Ind. 475; Steele v. City
of Bloomington, 83 Ind. App. 73; Julius Kellar Construction Co. et al. v.
Herkiin et al., 59 Ind. App. 472. It is true that instruction No. 11, taken
alone, was possibly one-sided and unfair to the appellant; however, the
jury had already been instructed that the burden was on the appellee to
show freedom from contributory negligence, and so instruction No. 6 takes
the unfairness out of instruction No. 11. Each instruction is to be considered in connection with all the other instructions given, and if they together
correctly state the law, they are sufficient. Citizens' Street Railway Co. v.
Merl, 26 Ind. App. 284; The Evansville and Crawfordsville Rd. Co. v.
Duncan, 28 Ind. 441; Baltimore and Ohio Rd. Co. v. Ranier, 84 Ind. App.
542; Terre Haute, Indianapolis and Eastern Traction Co. v. Hayes, 195
Ind. 638. The failure of the appellant to ask for an instruction dealing
with the obligations of a driver coming from the right, constitutes a waiver
of any alleged error in the court's failing to so instruct. Standard Forgings Co. v. Saffel, 176 Ind. 417; National City Bank v. Kirk, 85 Ind. App.
120; Reissner et al.'v. Oxley et al., 80 Ind. 580.
J. A. B.
NEGLIGENCE- MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-FURNISHING WATER-Plaintiff owned and operated nine greenhouses, all under glass and controlled
and heated by a system of steam boilers and pipes and water pumps.
In the winter of 1923 and the spring of 1924 plaintiff had many thousands
of flowers and plants growing in his greenhouses, and the most destructive
pest which he was required to combat was a small red spider. The only
practical way of combatting and destroying it was by chilling, killing and
blowing it off by forceful spraying of water at least three times a week,
at which time it was necessary to have 60 pounds pressure. The defendant city had for 13 years previous to the winter of 1923 supplied plaintiff
with the necessary pressure. On March 14, 1924, and for 13 days following, defendant negligently, and without warning to plaintiff, caused the
water pressure in his water pipes and water hose at his place of business
to be stopped so that no water would run through them. And though the
defendant later furnished plaintiff with water, it at times failed to supply
the water regularly and constantly, as his business required. By reason of
such negligence the plaintiff was greatly damaged in being unable to properly combat the above-mentioned red spider. The defendant demurred to
the complaint on the ground that there was no contract existing between
the parties upon which this action could be maintained. The court below
overruled the demurrer. Judgment was given for the plaintiff and the de-
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fendant appeals. Held: The appellant, appellee and trial court having
construed the complaint as being a complaint for damages occasioned by
defendant's negligence, and the case having been tried on that theory in
the court below, the Appellate Court will determine the issues on the theory that the complaint is predicated on negligence. That a city is liable
for negligence in supplying water for consumption of its inhabitants on
same principle as a private corporation. City of Huntingburg v. Morgen,
Appellate Court of Indiana, June 29, 1928, 162 N. E. 255.
The court, in holding the defendant municipality liable for the damages
occasioned by the negligence of the municipality in supplying the plaintiff
with proper water pressure, continued to follow a long line of decisions
handed down by the courts of last resort in Indiana, all of which hold
municipalities liable for the negligent performance of purely ministerial
functions. Brinkmeyer v. City of Evansville, 29 Ind. 187; Ross v. City of
Madison, 1 Ind. 281, 48 Am. Dec. 361; Stackhouse v. City of Lafayette, 26
Ind. 17, 89 Am. Dec. 450; Roll v. City of Indianapolis, 52 Ind. 547; City of
Greencastle v. Martin, 74 Ind. 451; Aiken v. City of Columbus, 167 Ind.
139; City of Indianapolis,v. Williams, Guardian, 58 Ind. 447.
This rule is generally adhered to in other jurisdictions. Sheldon v. Village of Kalamazoo, 24 Mich. 383; Stanley v. Inhabitants of Town of Sangerville, 119 Me. 28, 109 Atl. 190, 9 A. L. R. 348; McEntee v. Kingston
Water Co., 165 N. Y. 27, 58 N. E. 785; Watson v. Inhabitants of Needham,
161 Mass. 404, 37 N. E. 204, 24 L. R. A. 287.
The function of a city in selling and distributing water to its citizens is
of a private nature, voluntarily assumed by it for the advantage of the
people of the city. Responsibility for the acts of persons representing it in
such a business falls upon the city through the relation of master and servant and the maxim of "respondeat superior" applies. The following adjudications uphold this liability upon the ground that the city, in conducting
such business, is acting in its proprietary capacity: Lynch v. City of
Springfield, 174 Mass. 430, 54 N. E. 871; Hourigan v. City of Norwich, 77
Conn. 358, 59 Atl. 487; City of Chicago v. Selz, Schwab & Co., 202 Ill.
545, 67 N. E. 386; Bullmaster w. City of St. Joseph, 70 Mo. App. 60; Philadelphia v. Gilmartin, 71 Pa. 140. The power of a city to construct and
maintain waterworks is not a political or governmental function, but a
private and corporate one. Illinois Trust & avings Bank v. Arkansas
City, 22 C. C. A. 171, 40 U. S. App. 257, 76 F. 271, 34 L. R. A. 518;
sas City, 22 C. C. A. 171, 40 U. S. App. 257, 76 F. 271, 34 L. R. A. 518;
Pikes Peak Power Co. v. Colorado Springs, 44 C. C. A. 330, 105 F. 1;
Omaha Water Co. v. Omaha, 77 C. C. A. 267, 147 F. 1, 12 L. R. A. (N. S.)
736, 8 Ann. Cas. 61.
The courts almost universally hold that fire protection is a governmental function, and that neither the municipality, nor a private corporation contracting with the city for the performance of this function, are
liable for negligently performing such function. H. R. Moch Ca., Inc., v.
Rensselaer Water Co., 247 N. Y. 160, 159 N. E. 896; Fitch v. Seymour
Water Co., 139 Ind. 214, 37 N. E. 982, 47 Am. St. Rep. 258; Jennie DePauw
Mem., etc., Church v. New Albany Water Works, 193 Ind. 368, 140 N. E.
540, 27 A. L. R. 1274; Larimore v. Indianapolis Water Co., 197 Ind. 457,
151 N. E. 333. There are a few contra jurisdictions in regard to the lia-
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bility of a private corporation for the negligent supplying of water in case
of fire. Gorrell v. Greensboro Water Supply Co., 124 N. C. 328, 32 S. E.
720, 46 L. R. A. 513, 70 Am. St. Rep. 598; PaducahLumber Co. v. Paducah
Water Supply Co., 89 Ky. 340, 12 S. W. 554; and Woodburry v. Tampa
Waterworks Co., 57 Fla. 243, 49 So. 556, 21 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1034.
T. R. D.
SCHOOLS AND

SCHOOL DISTRICTS--NEGLIGENCE-STATE

LIABILITY

FOR

ToRTs.-Action by appellant, a 12-year-old school girl, against the township in which she resided, and others, to recover damages for injuries sustained by her when the school hack in which she was riding overturned.
Original complaint charged all appellees with negligence. The township
entered a demurrer, which was sustained. Appellant fied an amended
complaint as to the other appellees, but refused to plead further as to the
township. Held: Complaint was demurrable as respects the school township. Affirmed. Forrester v. Soimerlott et al., Ind. App., Oct. 11, 1928,
163 N. E. 121.
School corporations, as a part of the educational system of the State,
are agencies of the State. Jordan v. City of Logansport, 178 Ind. 629, 99
N. E. 1061; Ehle v. State ex rel. Wissler, 191 Ind. 502, 133 N. E. 748; and,
as such, they are not subject to an action for damages for injuries received
by any one on account of negligence of officers or agents. Freel v. School
City of Crawfordsville, 142 Ind. 27, 41 N. E. 312, 37 L. R. A. 301; Board
of Commissioners of Jasper County v. Allman, 142 Ind. 573, 42 N. E. 206;
Talbott v. Board of Commissioners of the County of St. Joseph, 42 Ind.
App. 198, 85 N. E. 376.
That the school corporation is an agent of the State seems unquestionable; that the State is not liable for negligence of its officers and agents is
undoubtedly the general rule in Indiana; but that the doctrine of State
irresponsibility should be the law is, on principle, very questionable. This
doctrine, based on a theory of State sovereignty, has its roots in the now
exploded belief in the divine right and prerogative of kings. Borchard, 28
Columbia L. R. 577, at 583. The modern trend of legal philosophy seems
to be toward treating the State as a personality and holding it liable for its
torts the same as an individual. -German and French courts have advanced
this far. Idem, 773, 774. The doctrine that a county or a municipality is
answerable in damages for personal injuries caused by its negligence in
keeping streets, sidewalks, bridges, and crossings, is well established. Town
of Newcastle v. Grubbs, 171 Ind. 482, 86 N. E. 757; Board of Commissioners of Huntington County v. Huffman, Admr., 134 Ind. 1, 31 N. E. 570;
Glantz v. City of South Bend, 106 Ind. 305, 6 N. E. 632; City of Fort
Wayne v. Patterson,3 Ind. App. 34, 29 N. E. 167. And a distinction, based
upon principle and equitable considerations, between the cases just cited
and the present one, is hard to draw. When a person is injured by the tort
of a municipality, the municipality ought to pay the injured party damages
just the same as he would be paid were he injured by the tort of any other
corporation.
D. J.

